



U.S. Department of Justice  
Immigration and Naturalization Service

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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS  
425 E. Street N.W.  
ULLE 3rd Floor  
Washington, D.C. 20535

FILE: [REDACTED] Office: Madrid

Date: JAN 24 2003

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under  
Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,  
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT: [REDACTED]

PUBLIC COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:


This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,  
EXAMINATIONS

  
Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge, Madrid, Spain, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Spain who was admitted to the United States in May 2000 as a nonimmigrant visitor under the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP) for a period not to exceed 90 days. She departed in April 2001. The applicant failed to apply for or to receive an extension of temporary stay and remained longer than authorized. She was found to be inadmissible to the United States by a consular officer under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more 180 days but less than one year.

The applicant married a native of Cuba and naturalized U.S. citizen in the United States on August 7, 2000, and she is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. The applicant seeks a waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act.

The officer in charge concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits various documents including a letter from the applicant's husband, a letter from a doctor in West Palm Beach, Florida indicating that the applicant had been under his care for a high risk pregnancy from September 2000 to April 2001, and a psychiatric evaluation for the applicant's spouse. There are also several documents in Spanish, without translation. It is unknown what relevance these documents have to the appeal.

In the letter from the applicant's husband, hereafter referred to as Gustavo, he discusses the problems facing his wife and daughter in Venezuela, where they are presently living. The applicant is presumed to be living with her mother who has a Venezuelan address. Gustavo states that the Service failed to consider the emotional aspects of separation and the welfare of their daughter.

The psychiatric evaluation of Gustavo, dated October 7, 2002, indicates that Gustavo is feeling tense and depressed, reactive to the situation regarding his wife's immigration problems. The psychiatrist stated that he would start Gustavo in individual supportive psychotherapy and supervised medications.

The Associate Commissioner notes a prior letter from the applicant, dated September 16, 2001, in which she states that Gustavo was offered a job at the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Spain, which he accepted. The applicant states that they arrived in Barcelona in April 2001, but after living and working there for a few months, Gustavo realized that this was not the place he would like to raise their daughter. They decided to return to the United States in December 2001 when his contract expired.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(i) Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States, whether or not pursuant to section 244(e), prior to the commencement of proceedings under section 235(b)(1) or section 240, and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, or

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure from the United States, is inadmissible.

(v) The Attorney General has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by the Attorney General regarding a waiver under this clause.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act was amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). After reviewing the IIRIRA amendments to the Act relating to fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence in the United States, and after noting the increased penalties Congress has placed on such activities, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar in some instances, eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship, and providing a ground of inadmissibility for unlawful presence (entry without inspection) after April 1, 1997, it is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful presence of aliens in the United States.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) has held that extreme hardship is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible meaning, and that the elements to establish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. These factors should be viewed in light of the Board's statement that a restrictive view of extreme hardship is not mandated either by the Supreme Court or by its own case law. See Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I&N Dec. 413 (BIA 1996).

It is noted that the requirements to establish extreme hardship in the present waiver proceedings under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act do not include a showing of hardship to the alien as did former cases involving suspension of deportation. Present waiver proceedings require a showing of extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. This requirement is identical to the extreme hardship requirement stipulated in the amended fraud waiver proceedings under section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i). Therefore, it is deemed to be more appropriate to apply the meaning of the term "extreme hardship" as it is used in fraud waiver proceedings than to apply the meaning as it was used in former suspension of deportation cases.

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), the Board stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established "extreme hardship" in waiver proceedings under section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; (2) the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; (3) the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; (4) the financial impact of departure from this country; (5) and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

The Board noted in Cervantes-Gonzalez that the alien's wife knew that he was in deportation proceedings at the time they were married. The Board stated that this factor goes to the wife's expectations at the time they were wed. The alien's wife was aware that she may have to face the decision of parting from her husband or following him to Mexico in the event he was ordered deported. The alien's wife was also aware that a move to Mexico would separate her from her family in the United States. The Board found this to undermine the alien's argument that his wife will suffer extreme hardship if he is deported. The Board then refers to Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), where the court stated that "extreme hardship" is hardship that is unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. The common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.

The applicant in the present matter was admitted to the United States in May 2000 for a period not to exceed 90 days. She remained longer than authorized without applying for or obtaining an extension of temporary stay. The applicant married Gustavo in August 2000 and it must be presumed that Gustavo was aware of that when they married.

The Board in Cervantes-Gonzalez, *supra*, also referred to Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 983 (1971), where the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to

say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, fails to establish the existence of hardship to the applicant's spouse (the only qualifying relative) caused by separation that reaches the level of extreme as envisioned by Congress if the applicant is not allowed to return to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.